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Ex-combatants as social activists: War, peace, 
and ideology in Burundi 
  
Introduction 
On a relatively quiet Bujumbura evening in August 2015, when most of my interlocutors 
were staying put in their own neighbourhoods, I joined an international development 
expatriate and a few of her upper middle-class Burundian friends for a beer. When asked 
what brought me to Burundi, I told them I was doing research with ex-combatants. ‘Ah, ex-
combatants. They are all recyclable’ one of the men exclaimed. ‘They go from combatant to 
ex-combatant to combatant again’. Everyone laughed. It was an innocent enough joke, but 
one that was very telling of the dominant discourse on ex-combatants.  
This was during a time of high tension in Burundi. Popular protests against 
President’s Nkurunziza’s third term had broken out four months earlier, a coup attempt had 
failed in May, and the newly-conducted elections had been accompanied by a fair share of 
violence. Scattered incidences of violence had become commonplace after the protests and 
the potential for greater violence—even a new, full-scale civil war— loomed in the air. Ex-
combatants were considered a major threat. 
There is nothing uniquely Burundian in the notion that ex-combatants pose a threat to 
peace. Both the academic and policy-oriented literature on peace-building has discussed the 
problems of disarming and demobilising ex-combatants, viewing them as potential threats to 
a fragile peace and a problem to be solved. 1 This is not illogical, given that violence 
committed by ex-combatants in countries around the world has, indeed, posed a threat to 
peace.2 There is, however, other research that points towards the possibility that the threat of 
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ex-combatants returning to violence is smaller than usually assumed,3 and suggests that when 
it happens the causes are more complicated than the simple disgruntlement of well-trained 
men and women who lack economic opportunities.4 
Many of my ex-combatant interlocutors were doing paid and unpaid work relating to 
community development, conflict prevention and peace-building. They explained their 
reasons for having joined the war in social activist, and sometimes patriotic, terms, wanting 
to do something for their country and community. These post-war projects, and their 
explanations for participation in war, were very similar, whether the combatants had come 
from the former state military or former rebel groups.    
There seems to be a shift towards a more nuanced approach to research on ex-
combatants, with more diverse ideas becoming more prominent, something I intend to 
contribute to. In this article, I look at the connection between the active combat during armed 
conflict and the social activism of ex-combatants in the aftermath of armed conflict. I argue 
that the role of ideology needs to be taken seriously as a motivation for both violent and 
peaceful modes for positive change. Choosing to fight in civil war and to work for peace or 
community development during peacetime are thus not necessarily polar opposites.  
Following from this, I suggest that ex-combatants are an untapped resource for peace-
building and conflict prevention, and that their willingness or interest in remobilising is far 
from given.  
What is unique about this research is its timing. The data was collected in Burundi 
throughout the year 2015, when tension was high. Incidence of violence was commonplace in 
certain areas, a large number of people fled the country and new potential rebel groups were 
forming. The fear of a renewed full-scale civil war was thus tangible and justified, rather than 
being an abstract notion. The situation offered a unique opportunity to research the reaction 
of ex-combatants regarding potential re-mobilisation. 
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I begin this article by discussing the literature on ex-combatants and the role of 
ideology in conflict. I then provide a brief overview of conflict in Burundi, followed by an 
account of my methodology. I thereafter discuss Burundian ex-combatants’ disinterest in 
violence and re-mobilisation, and how their social activism can be seen as a continuation of 
ideology rather than a transformation from their experience as active fighters.  
 
Understanding ex-combatants and the role of ideology 
Since 1989, projects on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) have become 
increasingly prevalent in peace-building and reconstruction in the aftermath of war.5 A 
number of academic studies on DDR have followed suit.6 These programmes, and the 
academic work that studies them, have had a tendency to focus on processes and 
technicalities, rather than on the political, social and economic contexts in which they take 
place, and it has been argued that this focus hinders their effectiveness.7 There has been less 
focus on the political aspect of reintegrating ex-combatants into their communities following 
armed conflict.8 
 Due to this focus on DDR as a technical process rather than as part of a larger 
political problem, there has been a tendency to view ex-combatants as a potential threat to 
peace. Conventional DDR programmes have viewed ex-combatants as individualised 
problems of violence in otherwise peaceful societies.9 This is a simplification of the post-
conflict situation, but changing individuals rather than whole societies may seem the less 
daunting task. This focus is perhaps not completely illogical, as there are a number of 
instances when some ex-combatants have turned to violence,10 even though this is not all ex-
combatants, and not under all circumstances.11  
Ex-combatants are not a homogenous group, which is an essential starting point when 
discussing their violence or peace-building potential. A shift has taken place in the literature, 
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with more research emphasising the complexities of DDR, as well as more nuanced 
understandings of ex-combatants.12 There is some evidence indicating that ex-combatants do 
not participate in violence to a great degree— for example, from Colombia.13 Due to their 
experiences, ex-combatants can, in many ways, be more difficult to attract back to conflict 
with promises of economic or political gains. Many ex-combatants become disillusioned with 
their former armed groups due to the high costs they paid in the war, for few benefits.14 Their 
intimate experience of violence may also turn them into adamant non-violence activists.15 
Regarding Burundi, Peter Uvin points out that many of the ex-combatants there wanted to 
demobilise. They were fed up with the war, the military structure, and they felt they had 
already achieved what they aimed for.16 Many were thus eager to leave the military lifestyle.  
Age is another important factor to take into consideration. The older ex-combatants 
grow, the less interested they are in violence, and the more interested in family life. In 
Colombia, for instance, criminal organisations in have replaced ex-combatants, and rely on 
younger recruits.17 Thus, age may deter ex-combatants themselves from participating in 
violence, and may deter the instigators of violence from approaching them.  
The motivation of entrepreneurs of violence— political or military elites that initiate 
violence— is also necessary for ex-combatants to take up arms again. The majority of ex-
combatants themselves usually lack the resources and leadership skills necessary for 
organised violence.18 Related to this, it is important to take note of what Brett and Specht19 
have identified as one of the primary causes for young people’s participation in war: the fact 
that there is already a war going on. Most people join armed groups under violent 
circumstances, not during peaceful times.     
Not only are ex-combatants not always a threat to peace, some are reported to be 
potential agents of positive change. Research from a wide variety of conflict settings have 
identified many former combatants with what Shobna Sonpar20 calls an ‘activist identity’. In 
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some cases, ex-combatants were social activists before joining armed groups21. In some 
cases, an in-country history of social activism helped insurgent groups mobilise fighters for 
their cause.22 Activism may be guided by a desire to contribute to the community.  Van der 
Merwe and Smith,23 focusing on ex-combatants in South Africa, whilst also drawing lessons 
from Angola, Burundi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, emphasise the passion 
many ex-combatants have for making contributions to their communities. They argue that 
these men and women are often social activists with a good understanding of the causes of 
social injustices.24 
Thus, joining armed groups is not necessarily a complete rotation in the life 
trajectories of these men and women. Of the many diverse and interlinked reasons motivating 
an individual to join an armed group, ideology should be considered as one factor. By 
ideology, I refer to the definition put forward by Gutierréz Sanín and Wood25 to  
mean a more or less systematic set of ideas that includes the identification of a 
referent group…, an enunciation of the grievances or challenges that the group 
confronts, the identification of objectives on behalf of that group…, and a 
(perhaps vaguely defined) program of action 
It is important to note that the referent group can be very loosely defined; some of my 
interlocutors thought of the Hutu as that group, but many seemed to think of it in much looser 
terms, such as ‘the marginalised’ or ‘the oppressed’. 
In recent years a number of theories regarding motivation to participate in civil war 
have been put forward, including on greed and grievance26, and structural factors such as 
poverty and demography,27 amongst others. These theories have naturally been met with 
criticism; for example, for simplification and lack of contextualisation.28 Other scholars have 
rather focused on de-pathologising the motivations of combatants.29 It is important to note 
that different theories explaining engagement in violence should not be considered mutually 
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exclusive.30 There can be a number of different reasons that motivate an individual to join an 
armed group, and these reasons may change during the course of the conflict.31 
Ideology, as one reason for joining armed conflict, is perhaps sometimes overlooked, 
especially in conflicts where economic reasons are more obvious.32 Elisabeth Jean Wood has 
drawn attention to the emotional and moral reasons contributing to the emergence of 
insurgent collective violence in situations where the poor are marginalised and excluded, and 
their claims on the state are met with repression. She uses the term pleasure of agency to 
explain that the participants in El Salvador’s insurgency took pride in being agents in the 
making of history. Their motivation was not simply based on changing their own lives, but on 
those of others as well.33   
Northern Ireland offers a good example of how former combatants’ social activism 
has been successful in peace-building efforts. Former combatants there have been agents, and 
leaders even, in the peace-building process.34 They have taken part in projects engaging with 
young people allowing youth to learn about the realities of violent conflict.35 Similar projects 
have taken place in Serbia.36 A number of community-based organisations of former 
combatants have formed in Northern Ireland, and it has been argued that they have given 
their members a new identity: the ‘politically-motivated’ former combatant.37  
The benefits of involving former terrorists/combatants/militants in conflict prevention 
is becoming normalised in the literature on Europe. Based on the experience of Northern 
Ireland, there is now a discussion on whether returning Islamic State fighters in the United 
Kingdom can have a role in preventing violence.38 Literature on former ETA members in 
Spain,39 and on ex-combatants in Croatia,40 discuss the potential of these groups in peace-
building and conflict prevention. Currently, research concludes that these groups have not 
been effective in this way in these countries. This is an interesting focus however, and 
different to the general discussion on ex-combatants elsewhere in the world. 
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There has been a shift in the discourse on ex-combatants, from viewing them simply 
as troublemakers to a more diverse understanding. There is now an accumulation of research 
that problematises a simplistic view of the diverse group of people that former fighters are, 
and offers a more nuanced perspective. Ideology and social activism should be taken into 
account as factors that motivate individuals to participate in armed conflict. I aim to 
contribute to the existing theorising on the role of ideology and social activism in the actions 
of combatants and ex-combatants. I will do this by exploring the case of Burundi during a 
time when the potential for a renewed civil war was looming and new rebel groups were 
being formed.  
 
Recent conflict in Burundi 
Burundi’s post-colonial history has alternated between periods of relative peace and episodes 
of violence. This has been explained by Ngaruko and Nkurunziza as a cycle of predation, 
rebellion and repression.41 After independence from Belgium in 1962, episodes of violence 
took place in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993, which lead to a full-scale civil war, usually 
considered to have ended in 2005, when democratic elections were held. Violence has thus 
become a structural pattern of politics.42 Violence played an important role in blocking the 
process of democratization in the early years of independence, as well as protecting the 
power of the ruling Tutsi minority.43 Progressively, both the main political party, UPRONA, 
and the army became ‘tutsified’,44 leaving the Hutu majority with few options but armed 
rebellion as a means of resistance.45 
The episodes of violence in independent Burundi followed a recurring pattern. In 
1965, Hutu military officers staged a coup. The Tutsi military retaliated, killing Hutu 
government members and civilians. These acts lead to the elimination of Hutu leadership.46 
In 1972, a number of Hutu massacred thousands of Tutsi in the southern part of Burundi. 
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Again, the Tutsi military retaliated, this time killing between 200,000 and 300,000 Hutu, 
particularly targeting educated Hutu.47 Crisis erupted again in 1988, when Hutu rebels killed 
civilians, this time in the North of the country. As before, the army reacted forcefully.48 This 
time, the international community responded to the acts of violence, and the Burundi 
government was persuaded to make constitutional and political reforms leading to multiparty 
presidential and legislative elections in 1993. Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, and his party, 
FRODEBU, won a decisive victory,49 making Ndadaye the first civilian and elected president 
of the Republic of Burundi.50 Only three months into office, however, Ndadaye was killed in 
an attempted coup d’état. This was the trigger for civil war. The civil war pitted 
predominantly Hutu rebel groups— the most important being the Conseil National pour la 
Défense de la Démocratie - Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and the 
Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) — against a predominantly Tutsi state military.  
By the end of the civil war, the World Bank estimated that about 60,000 ex-
combatants would be eligible for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) 
programme. By the end of the programme, approximately 26,000 ex-combatants had been 
demobilised and approximately 21,000 individuals reintegrated.51 The definition of 
reintegration was simply that these individuals had received reintegration assistance. The 
reintegration process has not been free from criticism, and is considered by some not to have 
been truly implemented.52 In addition, although research suggests that the DDR programme 
helped participants economically, this has reportedly not translated into social and political 
reintegration.53  
 Following the 2005 elections, there was optimism for Burundi’s future.54 However, 
Burundi’s problems and history were not erased overnight, and the process of building a new 
democratic country remained. In addition, domestic conflicts, such as land disputes, persisted. 
Yet Burundi was generally presented as a success story, by peace-building practitioners and 
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academics alike. It is possible that the focus on success, and the need to present a success 
story, caused many of the problems since 2005 to be overlooked.55  
The CNDD-FDD, the biggest rebel group during the war, and now the ruling political 
party, won the elections in 2005, and their leader, Pierre Nkurunziza, became President. The 
party seemed intent on holding onto power, and did so through corruption and the 
suppression of free media, civil society and the opposition. The party won the municipal 
elections in 2010, and the opposition, claiming election fraud, boycotted the legislative and 
presidential elections of that year. This boycott only strengthened the CNDD-FDD’s power 
hold. Tension rose in 2014 ahead of the 2015 elections. On April 25, 2015, the CNDD-FDD 
announced that Nkurunziza would be their presidential candidate, thus a presidential 
candidate for (what many argued was) an unconstitutional third term, and in breach of the 
Arusha Peace Agreement from the year 2000. Protests broke out immediately across 
Bujumbura.56 Two weeks into the protests, on the 13th of May, a coup attempt was made. 
Less than 48 hours later, it was clear that the attempt had failed. Grenade attacks and night-
time shootings became the norm in Bujumbura after the coup attempt, and there were 
constant rumours and a pervasive fear that a new civil war would break out. 
 
Methodology 
This article is based on data gathered from ethnographic fieldwork, which took place 
throughout the year 2015 in the unstable political environment referred to above. Fieldwork 
lasted for just under 10 months. An ethnographic approach is particularly useful for 
researching the practices of war and peace57 as it allows us to go beyond politicised discourse 
to scrutinise everyday political life.58  
The focus of my fieldwork was to build strong relationships with a small number of 
interlocutors in order to get a deeper, more holistic knowledge and understanding of people’s 
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lives than one-time interviews can achieve. Therefore, ‘deep hanging out’,59 as coined by 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, was the most suitable method. This meant that I met many of 
my interlocutors on a daily basis at their workplace. Some informants I met on a weekly 
basis, usually either after work hours, or during weekend afternoons. With other interlocutors, 
meetings took place on an approximately monthly basis. Aside from these meetings, I also 
took part in major events in my interlocutors’ lives, such as weddings and funerals, 
celebrating the birth of a child, or the graduation of a sibling. On these occasions, and 
sometimes during our regular meetings, I was introduced to wives, family members and 
friends. In addition to about 160,000 words of field notes, 18 individual interviews and four 
focus group discussions were recorded. The recorded interviews focused on their motivations 
for joining armed groups, their experiences and attitudes towards being a part of an armed 
group and their experiences going back to civilian life. 
The ex-combatants were from three different groups: the former state military, Forces 
Armées du Burundi (FAB); and the two biggest rebel groups during the war: the CNDD-
FDD, and the FNL. Three women were interviewed, but otherwise the interlocutors were 
men. They all joined the war at a young age, but at different times during the war; very few 
joined at the beginning. The age range when I met them thus varied from late twenties to 
mid-forties. 
 My introduction to the field came through a local civil society organization (CSO) 
based in Bujumbura. This CSO had conducted work with ex-combatants, and many of the 
staff members were ex-combatants themselves. Especially in the beginning, this CSO was 
vital for my research, identifying people to interview, setting up interviews and helping with 
translation as necessary. As my fieldwork progressed, I used my expanding network to find 
other participants, and was less reliant on the CSO. The ex-combatants I found through my 
network were mainly university students living in areas hard-hit by the protests in 2015, 
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which they were participating in. However, the CSO office remained my most important 
field-site, and many of my closest interlocutors were either staff members or in some way 
affiliated with the CSO. To protect the anonymity of my interlocutors, I have given them 
pseudonyms in this article, and the CSO will go unnamed. 
 Having established that long-term relationships and ‘deep hanging out’ was the most 
appropriate method for acquiring holistic data meant that my main interlocutors had to be 
able to converse in French or English. Given this requirement, and the fact that so many were 
affiliated with the CSO, these men are perhaps not ‘typical’ Burundian ex-combatants, if 
there is such a thing as a typical Burundian ex-combatant. They are better-off than many 
others when it comes to economic, social and cultural capital. The purpose of the article is not 
to claim that they represent all ex-combatants in Burundi or elsewhere. My intention is 
simply to point out that this group of people does exist. They usually don’t receive much 
attention; thus, a good reason to acknowledge them and understand them better. 
 
Burundian ex-combatants, violence and re-mobilisation 
As the joke that opens this article shows, the general discourse on ex-combatants in Burundi 
during my time there concerned their possible re-mobilisation. This discourse encompassed a 
belief that ex-combatants were violent in general. Many of my ex-combatant informants 
spoke of encountering this attitude, especially just after demobilisation, and how it affected 
their reintegration. Felix recalled how people were terrified of him in his old village, and 
believed he was a thief. ‘I don’t think anyone even dared sleep inside when I was around, 
knowing I was coming from the bush [coming back from the war]’ he stated. He claimed that 
even his own siblings were afraid of him, and he worried that the villagers might end up 
killing him, so he left for a bigger town. Elise told a similar story. People were afraid of her 
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when she came back from her years as an FNL fighter, and thought she would continue her 
violent behaviour. Alain often talked about this subject, and the injustice of it.  
For example, you can hear on the radio that in a commune x or y, a woman has 
been raped; automatically they say it is an ex-combatant who raped her. In 
Burundi society they are so judgmental, every time something happens, it is 
always ex-combatants. But I remember when I was a child in the 80s, there were 
people who raped women, there were thieves … so even before, these people 
were around, but today because there are people who joined armed groups, 
when anything wrong happens it is always ex-combatants [who are blamed]. 
Alain brought this up on a couple of occasions. He did, however, later mention something 
somewhat contradictory. He said that when the ex-combatants returned to his neighbourhood, 
the rate of theft went down; ‘even the thieves knew that when the ex-combatants were back in 
the neighbourhood there would be no leniency’. He backed away from this position a little bit 
at a later stage.  
Well, it was a way to earn back the trust of the people [living in the 
neighbourhood], it wasn’t, we didn’t throw people [burglars] to the dogs. But 
still, they knew that there would be a price to pay, those that came to rob and 
destroy would be severely punished. 
The implicit expectation that returning ex-combatants would use force to protect their local 
communities from crime is also found in South Africa, Sierra Leone and Liberia,60 although 
Alain was the only one of my informants who mentioned it. The others focused on the need 
to prove their peaceful behaviour to regain the trust of their communities. But it is an 
interesting paradox for ex-combatants to wrestle with; to be expected to be both peaceful and 
violent, depending on the needs of the community.  
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During the tension in Burundi in 2015, the concern was mostly not on the general 
violence of ex-combatants, however, but on whether they would go back to war. People were 
afraid that ex-combatants would escalate the violence that was occurring, and possibly cause 
civil war. Dieudonné, a former CNDD-FDD fighter, did not think that ex-combatants were 
going to be the main problem, though he admitted that some ex-combatants were unhappy. I 
asked him if this sort of discussion bothered him. ‘Yes, it bothers me because I see many ex-
combatants who are humble, who live with other people without problems. It bothers me to 
hear talk of ex-combatants going to be violent again.’ He paused and continued, ‘People who 
talk about war are the ones who don’t know its meaning’.  
The notion that ex-combatants would not go back to war because of their intimate 
experience of it came up frequently. Ex-combatants are the ones who know and understand 
war, and therefore, the last to go back it, was often claimed. Many of my interlocutors were 
sick and tired of the war, and longing for a different lifestyle, a finding corroborated by 
Uvin.61 Some of my interlocutors had been waiting for years for the war to end, since they 
wanted a different life but could not leave their armed group, as they feared they would be 
killed if they made the attempt.  
It was often added that those who really posed a threat to peace were those with no 
experience of participating in war, who therefore did not know or understand what they 
would be getting themselves into. Francine framed it like this: ‘What may surprise you is that 
because of what they [ex-combatants] went through, they no longer commit violence. This is 
only done by people who do not know what happened [in the war], [who] fantasise about 
what they have only heard of’. 
It should be emphasised once again that ex-combatants are far from a homogenous 
group. My aim is not to claim that no ex-combatants pose a threat to peace. None of the ex-
combatants I spoke to would make this claim. When I asked Francine if, by her above 
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comment she meant that ex-combatants were in fact less violent than the average civilian, she 
did not want to confirm this. ‘No, ex-combatants are no saints. Both sides [ex-combatants and 
civilians] have some violent people’. 
In this way, some of my informants took part in the discourse of some ex-combatants 
being a threat, although they always made it clear that they themselves were not part of the 
threatening group. Whether they had specific individuals in mind who might pose a threat, or 
if they were simply taking part in the popular discourse is unclear. Discussing the fear of ex-
combatants going back to war, Alain stated:  
It is true that there are people who were demobilised but up to now are still ex-
combatants, who are likely to re-join the rebellion if war would erupt tomorrow. 
Personally, for me, the war is no longer an option, it has no more space [in my 
life]. I am in a place where I am thinking about my future, where I need to think, 
where I must take time to think before acting.  
This was similar to what Olivier expressed:  
Now I can´t just decide in one moment to join the rebellion or an armed group, I 
must take time to think about the decision I am going to make … now I have a 
certain experience, I don’t know how to explain it … now, before making any 
decisions I must think about the impact of the action I am about to take. 
There seems to be an added maturity that both Alain and Olivier speak of. This could be due 
to their experiences gained with their armed groups. But another factor could simply be age 
and social standing, as Kaplan and Nussio have pointed out. Ex-combatants can, like other 
groups of people, simply age out of interest in violence and crime. Especially if they have 
strong family ties and children.62 
Some of my interlocutors were quite honest in saying that they did not know what 
they would do if civil war actually broke out. It was easy to say they did not want to 
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participate in war again, but difficult to predict what they would do if it broke out, although 
they hoped they would stay away. In the scenarios put forward, war was already happening, 
however; no one could see themselves, or would admit to seeing themselves, as part of the 
group that initiated war and violence. 
The exceptions were the occasional ex-combatant who had, for one reason or another, 
strong ties to former commanders who were now powerful people. Two of my interlocutors 
said they would be likely to join if civil war broke out, but it would be against their will. 
‘That is why war is a bad thing, you find yourself involved in it without choosing. If I join, it 
will be by force, not by choice’ one of them explained. 
 
Social activism of ex-combatants: continuity of ideology 
Far from making a living by violent means or stating an interest in re-mobilisation, many of 
my interlocutors were actively working on conflict prevention and peace-building 
programmes. Ex-combatants taking part in this line of work is not as great a contradiction as 
it may seem. The importance of ideology and social activism are consistent in the life 
trajectories of these men, and violence was often chosen in desperation during times when 
there were no other available options. I follow the anthropological trend of viewing war and 
peace not as complete opposites.   
In anthropological theorising, war and peace are viewed as intertwined and connected, 
as part of a continuum. War is thus not essentially different to peace, but relies on the same 
social and organisational skills that people use to sustain peace.63 War is a long-term struggle 
organised for political ends.64 Aspects of the struggle may predate the war, and may continue 
after its formal ending in different forms. War can thus be seen, as famously put by 
Clausewitz, as politics by other means.65 
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 Samuel’s story demonstrates the continuity of activism in different forms depending 
on circumstances. Samuel has been a proponent of Mandela, Gandhi and Martin Luther King 
from a young age. As a boy, he already had a keen interest in history and current affairs. He 
was active in the youth centre in his neighbourhood as a teenager, participating, for example, 
in their young leadership training programmes. He was also active in projects assisting 
orphans in the neighbourhood, of which there were many, since his neighbourhood was hard-
hit during the war. He seems to have been, judging by his own account, a model youth, 
someone donors of international aid would have invested in as a ‘leader of tomorrow’. Then, 
one day, at the age of 17, he joined a rebel group.  
Since the end of the war, he has been involved in a number of community projects, 
paid and unpaid. Nowadays he does not believe that violence can be a problem-solver. He is 
self-demobilised, and is quite disillusioned by his experience of the war, as well as with the 
political developments of his old armed group. Samuel’s active participation in the war 
should not be seen as incongruous with his social activism; his social activism is not 
something he started before joining the war, rejected during his time in the armed group, and 
returned to after the war. Samuel’s active participation in the war can be viewed as a part of 
his social activist trajectory; something he regrets today, but, at the time, something he felt 
was necessary for making positive change for Burundi and its people.  
As Samuel himself explained, many combatants were motivated by ideology: ‘Well, 
most of the people that went to the bush to help in the rebellion were people who actually had 
ideals; they were people that … they understood that there was a struggle to be lead, a change 
to be lead’. Given Samuel’s admiration for Mandela and other important figures related to 
peace and non-violence, this is not a surprising depiction of (ex-) rebels, but I was given the 
same explanation by a number of other interlocutors as well. 
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It was in fact quite remarkable to notice how frequently the reasons given for joining 
the war sounded like reasons for doing peace-building or other types of community work. 
Dieudonné explained his reasons for joining the war like this: ‘…my feelings were to help 
my country to maintain a lasting peace. For that to happen we had to fight with the group of 
people that mistreated people…’. Jean Claude, also focusing on the injustice that prevailed in 
Burundi at the time, said, ‘We couldn’t travel from one district to another without an ID, and 
sometimes even if you had an ID they would not let you travel. There was a lot of injustice, 
so joining was the only way to escape that injustice’. Given the oppression and social 
injustice in Burundi before the civil war, and the lack of peaceful avenues for resisting it, it 
can easily be argued that some of the people who chose to join would otherwise have taken 
part in more peaceful social activism. The role of ideology should thus be taken seriously as 
one of the factors that explain the many, interrelated reasons people take up arms during civil 
war.  
Ideology was also important for many of my interlocutors to keep them motivated and 
get them through the war.  Three of my interlocutors had joined their armed groups by force. 
They spoke of this with surprisingly little bitterness or victimisation. All three had similar 
stories to tell: they had been kidnapped or otherwise coerced, but soon accepted their fate. 
Henri stated that ‘in the beginning I didn´t know what I was doing, because I had joined 
without planning it, but after some months I chose to fight and I was motivated.’ I am 
inclined to believe this swift resignation to the unwanted situation was a survival strategy for 
these three men. They found themselves in dire, unsolicited circumstances and needed to 
justify being there in order to endure it. 
Of the three, Prosper was the one who resisted longest and made several attempts to 
flee. When I asked if he had wanted to leave the whole time, or if he had, at some point, felt a 
need to fight for the Hutu cause, he was quick to decline.  
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Me, I never fought for the Hutu…During the first months in the bush I was 
always thinking about fleeing, but in the long run I saw that this was risking my 
life and …there were peace negotiations going on and I thought there could be a 
way to find my family…so after these eight months, I decided to continue 
fighting. I tried to, to be open to the political ideology that was being taught, and 
understood that even though there were some extremists that confused the 
CNDD-FDD ideology with ethnicity, the ideology was that it isn´t ethnicity that 
kills, it is bad governance that kills…And after that, I understood that the 
CNDD-FDD ideology comprehends that the Hutu and the Tutsi can live 
together, and that lifted my spirit up a bit…the ideology of the CNDD-FDD 
never claimed to be for the Hutu, it was about fighting for democracy, human 
rights and equal rights of everyone… 
Finding a part of the ideology he could identify with helped Prosper get through his time 
actively taking part in the war, even though his interpretation was not shared by all of those 
around him. In this way ideology, or perception of ideology, can play an important part in 
war, even when the movement´s actions are not always in line with it.   
 A lack of coherence between the actions of armed groups and their ideologies was 
noted and brought discomfort. One focus group participant, reacting to another participant 
saying how much easier life had been, economically, during the war, discussed this.  
…this is not my point of view…we were fighting for what we called justice, and 
for me to get what I wanted, like food and money, most of the time I used 
violence without justice. This is why I prefer life after the war. I don´t have 
money, but I am proud of myself because what I fought for has been achieved. 
This quote recalls the pleasure of agency coined by Wood66 and the pride of taking part in 
making (positive) history. However, many of my informants had been quite discontent about 
19 
 
their stay in their armed groups and wished to leave long before the war was over. Most 
stated that they had not dared try to escape out of fear for their lives. Dieudonné and Henri, 
however, did successfully escape. Interestingly, both continued to work with their armed 
group afterwards; Henri, in particular, on outreach, mobilising youth and promoting the 
ideology of the group. Concern for personal safety surely played a part in their decisions to 
maintain these connections, yet, despite not wanting to take active part in the war, they 
seemed not to have lost belief in their armed group’s cause.  
  Activism and ideology seem to have played a part in all stages of my interlocutors’ 
lives, pre-combatant, combatant and ex-combatant. It is, therefore, perhaps not a huge shift in 
life trajectory for those now actively working on conflict prevention and peace-building. I 
asked Pascal once whether he thought ex-combatants could make good peacebuilders. Pascal 
was certain that they could—, they are the ones who know what war and combat are all 
about, after all. But he worried that they did not have the power to tackle what he considered 
to be the root causes of armed conflict: the sense of injustice. According to Pascal, the main 
reason people choose to join armed movements is their perception of injustice and the 
absence of paths to seek justice peacefully. 
 Many of my interlocutors spoke of their knowledge and understanding of war and 
combat as the reason they would be good peacebuilders. They know what they are talking 
about when they discourage youth from turning to violence. This is similar to the arguments 
made about ex-combatants and their work in terrorism prevention in Northern Ireland. Their 
experience gives them legitimacy. The local CSO that hosted me used this kind of legitimacy 
to encourage youth affiliated with political parties to avoid violence. During workshops and 
dialogue meetings they spoke in general terms, rather than about their personal experiences, 
but they emphasised the guilt that many ex-combatants suffered due to bad acts they 
participated in during the war.  
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There is certainly potential for ex-combatants to take part in peace-building and 
conflict prevention in Burundi. However, their low status presents an obstacle. One of the 
reasons that ex-combatants in Northern Ireland have become good leaders in terrorism 
prevention is that they are more respected than regular community workers.67 This is not the 
case in Burundi, where ex-combatants generally command very little respect. In one 
interview, the interviewee held that people from the community came to him for conflict 
resolution because he was an ex-combatant. This was, however, a very unusual claim; 
nowhere else did I hear of ex-combatants gaining from their status as ex-combatants in this 
manner. Yet actively involving ex-combatants in peace-building and conflict prevention, thus 
giving them new, useful roles may however be one step to better involve them in society. 
 
Conclusion 
The focus on ex-combatants’ potential as agents of positive change has been both 
underexplored and mostly limited to white, western former combatants, neglecting those 
residing outside the global north. There is plenty of empirical evidence illustrating that some 
ex-combatants tend to remobilise for armed conflict or participate in violent crime. However, 
this evidence is often interpreted to be representative of all ex-combatants.   
 The purpose of this article was to explore what drives ex-combatants to engage in 
social activism, such as conflict prevention and peace-building work. I have argued that 
ideology should be considered as one important motivating factor in joining active combat, 
and, therefore, that engaging in social activism when the war ends is a logical continuation. 
Many of my informants described themselves as social activists, and were eager to do work 
for their community. Many were also active in the sphere of conflict resolution and peace-
building. These activist attitudes, in many cases, predated their time participating in the war.  
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Viewing ex-combatants, not as a homogenous group, but as a diverse group of 
individuals, driven by different motivations and desires, certainly complicates the work of 
DDR programmes. It may make them more relevant, however. Not all ex-combatants are 
unhappy to return to civilian life. Many of my interlocutors had been waiting for that 
opportunity for years, but had been unable to leave their armed group for fear of being killed. 
It can be argued that ex-combatants who want to use their experience to help build a more 
peaceful country are an untapped resource in peace-building and conflict resolution. Making 
use of this resource could support work on conflict prevention and peace-building, and would 
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